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Abstract
Background: The aim of the present study was to investigate the role of disengagement beliefs in smoking
cessation. The association of disengagement beliefs with forward transition through the transtheoretical stages of
change and self-reported quitting were examined, with and without adjusting for processes of change.
Methods: A longitudinal survey was conducted among Dutch smokers, resulting in 367 respondents who
completed two questionnaires, one at baseline and one at 8 months follow-up. Disengagement beliefs, intention to
quit, actual quitting, and the processes of change were assessed.
Results: The findings showed that disengagement beliefs were negatively associated with forward stage transition
and actual quitting. Processes of change only partly mediated these associations.
Conclusions: Adhering to disengagement beliefs seems to be an inhibitor of progression towards smoking
cessation and actual quitting, also after adjustment for processes of change.
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Health education programs, mass media campaigns, and nowadays even the slogans depicted on
cigarette packages, warn smokers for the harmful health effects of smoking. Despite all these efforts,
many people continue to smoke. Because of the well-known negative health consequences of smoking,
and the high resistance of smokers to change, it can be assumed that some form of cognitive dissonance
reduction occurs in smokers, especially those not willing to quit (Chapman, Wong, & Smith, 1993).
Cognitive dissonance is experienced when an individual has two or more cognitions that are dissonant
in relation to one another, which results in motivational tension (Festinger, 1957; Wicklund & Brehm,
1976). Smokers can be expected to experience cognitive dissonance, because they continue to smoke
cigarettes despite their knowledge of the hazardous effects (McMaster & Lee, 1991).
Dissonance reduction in the form of denial or distortion of threatening information may affect
potential readiness to change in a negative manner. Bandura labeled this denial or distortion of
threatening information as disengagement (Bandura, 1986; Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, &
Pastorelli, 1996). In smokers, disengagement can emerge in the form of certain beliefs that are used
as excuses or justifications for continuing smoking. For example, smokers may downplay the effect of
smoking on health, or they may point out the dangers of other lifestyles. Smokers do indeed hold more
of these cognitive dissonance-reducing beliefs than ex-smokers do, which may indicate that successful
cessation is accompanied by the shedding of dissonance-reducing beliefs (Chapman et al., 1993).
Several studies have found that holding disengagement beliefs is related to intentions to quit smoking
and to undertaking quit attempts. Smokers who had the intention to quit adhered to significantly fewer
beliefs (Johnson, 1968; Olshavsky & Summers, 1974), and disengagement beliefs at baseline were
found to be associated with the likelihood of undertaking a quit attempt in the future (Dijkstra, 2003;
Dijkstra & Brosschot, 2003; Dijkstra, De Vries, Kok, & Roijackers, 1999). Disengagement beliefs may
prevent smokers from seriously thinking about, or considering the consequences of their behavior, and
could therefore lead to stagnation in the progression towards quitting. In a cross-sectional study by
Oakes, Chapman, Borland, Balmford, and Trotter (2004) on self-exempting beliefs (a construct similar
to disengagement beliefs, i.e., beliefs about personal immunity to health effects, skepticism about
medical evidence, normalizing dangers of smoking because of the abundance of risks, and beliefs that
smoking is worth probable health damage), the ability of these beliefs to predict intention to quit was
explored, using a modified version of the stage of change model. Self-exempting beliefs were found to
be related to interest in quitting, but some types of beliefs had greater influence than others on the
progression towards cessation. Beliefs that smoking is worth probable health damage were most closely
negatively related to intention to quit and thereby the only significant discriminator between the smoker
categories of precontemplators, contemplators and preparers.
The present study further explored the role of disengagement beliefs in the continuation of smoking
behavior. In this longitudinal study, we more closely examined the association between disengagement
beliefs and smoking cessation. Results of previous studies already showed that disengagement beliefs
are associated with both intention to quit (Dijkstra, 2003; Dijkstra & Brosschot, 2003; Dijkstra et al.,
1999; Oakes et al., 2004; Olshavsky & Summers, 1974) and quit attempts (Dijkstra, 2003; Dijkstra
and Brosschot, 2003; Dijkstra et al., 1999). The remaining question, however, is how adhering to
disengagement beliefs lowers the intention to quit and results in less quitting? To explore this issue,
using a longitudinal design, we first assessed if disengagement beliefs are associated with forward
transitions through the different stages of behavioral change and with actual cessation. Furthermore,
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what extent such processes may mediate the associations of disengagement beliefs with forward
transition through the stages of behavior change and actual cessation.
Over the years, several models to assess behavioral change have been postulated. In the area of
substance abuse, the stage of change model has become increasingly influential for assessing
motivations to alter behavior (Connors, Donovan, & DiClemente, 2001; Stephens, Cellucci, &
Gregory, 2004). This stage model defines five stages toward successful behavioral change. The stages
are defined in terms of an individual’s past behavior and his or her plans for future action, and
represent a temporal dimension in which shifts occur in motivation to quit smoking (Prochaska,
DiClemente, & Norcross, 1992). The first stage is precontemplation, in which the smoker is unaware
or under-aware of the risks of smoking, and shows no intention to quit in the near future. The next
stage is the contemplation stage, in which the smoker is thinking about the risks of smoking and
considers change. Intending to take action and small behavioral changes are indicative of the next
stage, i.e., the preparation stage, and in the action stage the smoker has recently quit smoking. The
final stage is the maintenance stage, in which the smoker works to prevent relapse and which is
reached when non-smoking was sustained for more than 6 months (Prochaska et al., 1992).
Certain processes are known to act as predictors of progress across the stages of change (Prochaska et
al., 1992; Prochaska, Norcross, Fowler, Follick, & Abrams, 1992). These processes of change are overt
as well as covert activities and experiences that individuals engage in, in order to attempt to change risk
behaviors. In addition, they can facilitate understanding of how shifts occur in motivation to change.
Each of the separate processes includes distinct methods and interventions that contribute differentially
to the completion of the different stages of behavior change (Prochaska et al., 1992). The processes of
change can be grouped into two higher-order factors, i.e., cognitive–affective processes and behavioral
processes (Kristeller, Rossi, Ockene, Goldberg, & Prochaska, 1992; O’Connor, Carbonari &
DiClemente, 1996; Prochaska, Velicer, DiClemente, & Fava, 1988). The processes of environmental
evaluation, self-evaluation, consciousness raising, and dramatic relief, tend to be used most frequently
during the contemplation and preparation stages of change and can be classified as cognitive–affective
processes, whereas the processes of reinforcement management, counterconditioning, stimulus control,
and helping relationship occur most frequently during the action and maintenance stages of change and
can be classified as behavioral processes (Prochaska et al., 1992; Rosen, 2000; see Table 1).
Engaging in processes of change is expected to instigate change in smoking, whereas engaging in
disengagement beliefs will lead to continuation of smoking. It is further expected that disengagement
beliefs precede the processes of change, and that processes of change precede movement across the stages
of change and actual smoking cessation. Smokers are considered to perceive a fairly constant threat by
knowing they are susceptible to possible health damage due to smoking. This threat will become less
worrisome when disengagement beliefs are used to deny or distort this knowledge or the information that
gives rise to this knowledge. Because of the lowered threat, the need for engaging in a threat-related
process of change becomes more obsolete. For example, the process of consciousness raising may be
promoted by perceived threat, because threatening knowledge or information increases the need for
reassessing one’s smoking behavior. Adhering to strong disengagement beliefs lowers the perceived
threat, and may thereby decrease the need for reassessment of one’s smoking. Adhering to more
disengagement beliefs is assumed to prevent engagement in the different processes of change. Another
example of a cognitive–affective process is dramatic relief; the process of dramatic relief is in itself a
parameter of threat. When the threat is removed by disengagement beliefs, a confrontation with the
Table 1
Sample items for the processes of change
Processes Description Sample item
Environmental
evaluation
Considering how smoking affects one’s
environment
I notice that more people disapprove of smoking
Self-evaluation Considering feelings and thoughts about the
self in relation to one’s smoking
I feel disappointed in myself because of my need
to smoke
Consciousness
raising
Increasing knowledge and information about
one’s smoking
I remember information about quitting smoking
Dramatic relief Experiencing and expressing feelings about
one’s smoking
Information about the consequences of smoking
frightens me
Reinforcement
management
Rewarding oneself or being rewarded by
others for changing smoking behavior
I reward myself if I don’t smoke
Counterconditioning Replacing smoking with alternatives I replace smoking by something else
Stimulus control Avoidance or dealing with stimuli that bring
out smoking
I avoid places where people smoke
Helping relationship Trust others and being open about one’s
smoking
I ask people who are near to me to help me not
to smoke
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management, counterconditioning, stimulus control, and helping relationship are different from the
cognitive–affective processes, for they are most frequently used during the action and maintenance stages
of change and therefore mostly regarded as aids not to smoke. The use of these processes in smokers is
directed by acute threat. Acute threat causes fear and therefore a motivation to stop or reduce smoking.
Strong disengagement beliefs decrease the threat and by this the necessity of the use of processes that help
to stop or to reduce smoking.
The first goal of the present longitudinal study is to examine if disengagement beliefs are related to
less forward stage transition through the stages of change and, in addition, to assess whether
disengagement beliefs are related to actual quitting. Engaging in disengagement beliefs is expected to be
associated with less forward stage transition and less actual quitting (Hypothesis 1).
The second goal is to assess whether there is a negative relation between the degree of disengagement
beliefs one has about smoking and the activities and experiences one is engaged in when attempting to
quit smoking, i.e., the processes of change (Hypothesis 2).
The final goal of the present study is to assess if the processes of change are positively related to
forward stage transition and actual quitting, and, if that is the case, to assess if the processes of change
mediate the relation between disengagement beliefs and forward stage transition, and the relation
between disengagement beliefs and actual quitting (Hypothesis 3).2. Method
2.1. Recruitment
Smokers were recruited by means of advertisements in local newspapers throughout The
Netherlands. Smokers who were not planning to quit, smokers who were planning to quit, and ex-
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smoking cessation. The group of ex-smokers was not included in this study. A chance to win one of
ten bonus prices of $100 was offered to participants who would complete the two questionnaires.
After participants had registered at the University by means of a phone call (N=800), the T1
questionnaire (including a pre-paid envelope to return the questionnaire) was sent to them. At T1,
423 smokers responded. A total of 19 participants were excluded because they were cigar or pipe
smokers, as well as one person who was under aged (15 years old). Furthermore, after casewise
listing of residuals in logistic regression analyses on model variables, seven outliers were omitted
from the analyses, leaving a total of 396 respondents at T1. Subsequently, 8 months later the second
questionnaire (T2) was sent, and was returned by 367 participants (93% of the 396 T1 respondents).
2.2. Measures
The demographic variables measured were gender, age, and education level. Educational level
was categorized as low, medium, or high. Schooling systems in The Netherlands refer to vocational
training as low, advanced vocational training as medium, and college/university training as high.
Smoking and quitting behavior was assessed in terms of the number of years smoked, the number of
cigarettes smoked per day, the number of quit attempts, and the duration of the longest quit attempt.
Actual quitting was measured by the question: bHave you quit smoking or are you currently engaged in a
quit attempt?Q (Yes/No).
Biochemical verification of the self-report quitting behavior was not conducted for several reasons.
First, an increase in non-response and dropout was expected had biochemical verification been
required. Secondly, the present study was considered to be one of low demand. Hence, several
studies indicated that self-reported smoking behavior can be considered valid (Velicer, Prochaska,
Rossi, & Snow, 1992).
2.2.1. Disengagement beliefs
Disengagement beliefs were assessed using a scale consisting of twelve items. This scale has been
tested and validated in earlier studies (Dijkstra & Brosschot, 2003; Dijkstra et al., 1999). The items
consisted of reasons or excuses why it would be okay to smoke, regardless of the well-known
harmful health effects. Examples of items are: bI know heavy smokers who live longQ and bI have
to die of somethingQ. The items could be scored on a 5-point scale ranging from I do not agree (1)
to I do agree (5) and were constructed such that the respondent had to finish the sentence:
bSmoking can make me ill, but. . .Q. Cronbach’s a was 0.84. Table 2 shows the results of the factor
analysis (PCA) and the mean and standard deviation (S.D.) of the 12 items of the disengagement
beliefs scale.
2.2.2. Stages of change
The stages of change were measured by asking respondents to indicate if and when they planned
to stop smoking on a 9-point ordinal scale ranging from 1 (b I am planning to quit within the next 10
daysQ) to several levels (bplanning to quit within one monthQ, bplanning to quit within six monthsQ,
bplanning to quit within one yearQ, bplanning to quit within five yearsQ, bplanning to quit within ten
yearsQ, bplanning to quit somewhere in the future but not within the next 10 yearsQ, bplanning to
never quit but planning to cut downQ) to 9 (bplanning to never quit and not planning to cut downQ).
Table 2
Pattern matrix, means and standard deviations for disengagement beliefs
Smoking can make me ill, but. . . Factor loading Mean S.D.
Pollution is just as unhealthy 0.72 3.47 1.43
There are lots of risks in life 0.68 3.70 1.30
Everything is unhealthy 0.67 3.08 1.40
You have to die of something 0.66 2.47 1.44
Everyone acts unhealthy sometimes 0.64 3.76 1.22
Not everyone gets sick smoking 0.63 4.13 1.04
Know heavy smokers that lived long 0.62 3.77 1.26
Medical science will invent something 0.60 2.46 1.22
Rather a short/good life than a long/boring life 0.55 3.13 1.45
If it were really bad, it would be forbidden 0.52 2.38 1.43
I live healthy otherwise 0.47 3.58 1.18
Health is not the only thing in life 0.42 2.50 1.44
% Variance 36.40
Factor analysis by principal component analysis.
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month, whereas those who agreed on planning to quit within the next 6 months were designated as
contemplators. Precontemplators were those respondents who were planning to quit within the next
year or the next 5 years, but not in the next 6 months, those who agreed to quit somewhere in the
future but not within 5 years, or those who had no plans to quit at all (Dijkstra, Bakker, & De Vries,
1997; Dijkstra, Roijackers, & De Vries, 1998; Dijkstra, Tromp, & Conijn, 2003).
2.2.3. Processes of change
The processes of change were assessed by four cognitive–affective and four behavioral processes of
the processes of change [17]. The cognitive–affective processes used are: Environmental evaluation (6
items), Self-evaluation (3 items), Consciousness raising (6 items), and Dramatic relief (3 items). The
behavioral processes of change are: Reinforcement management (5 items), Counterconditioning (5
items), Stimulus control (7 items), and Helping relationship (5 items). The items could be scored on a 5-
point scale ranging from (0) never to (4) often, and followed the question: bHow often did the following
occur in the last four weeks?Q. Examples of the items used to measure the processes of change are shown
in Table 1. The reliabilities of the scales were found to be good to excellent (Cronbach’s a ranges from
0.74 to 0.93).
2.3. Attrition analysis
Of the 396 respondents at T1, 7% did not fill out the questionnaire at T2, leaving 367 participants in
the prospective study cohort. Dropouts were compared with remaining respondents on the variables
gender, age, education, disengagement beliefs, stages of change, processes of change, and number of
cigarettes a day using logistic regression. Dropout was significantly predicted by stage of change (odds
ratio (OR)=1.75, pb0.05, 95% confidence interval (CI)=1.09–2.82). Further analyses using Chi-square
values showed that participants in the preparation and precontemplation stage dropped out more
frequently, than participants in the contemplation stage. In addition, higher scores on self-evaluation,
consciousness raising, and stimulus control significantly predicted dropout (OR=1.43, 95% CI=1.07–
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OR 1.95, 95% CI=1.10–3.47, pb0.05 for stimulus control). Respondents who scored higher on
evaluating feelings and thoughts about their own smoking, who more actively increase their knowledge
and information about smoking, and who reported more avoidance of or dealing with stimuli that bring
out smoking, were more likely to drop out.
2.4. Sample characteristics
Of the 367 respondents included in T1 and T2, 71.1% was female; 21.8% had a low education, 45.7%
had a medium education, and 31.9% of the respondents had a high education. The mean age was 43.78
years (S.D.=13.5, range 16–80). On average respondents smoked 19 cigarettes a day (S.D.=9.7, range
1–60). At T2, 103 respondents reported at least one attempt to quit smoking and 34 respondents reported
to have actually quit smoking. At T1, there were 290 respondents classified as precontemplators, 43 as
contemplators, and 34 as preparers. At T2, 280 respondents were classified as precontemplators, 32 as
contemplators, and 20 as preparers. A total of 34 respondents had moved into the action stage at T2 and
1 respondent moved to the maintenance stage. 71 respondents reported forward stage transition and 43
respondents reported backward stage transition.
2.5. Statistical analyses
To explore if disengagement beliefs differed between stages of change, ANOVAs were conducted. To
examine whether disengagement beliefs are associated with forward stage transition, logistic regression
analyses were conducted to estimate ORs with 95% CIs for forward stage transition. Stage transitions are
considered forward if a respondent moves from one stage at T1 to a latter stage at T2. Analyses were
carried out for precontemplators, contemplators, and preparers taken together as one group, and, in
addition, separate analyses were done for the group of precontemplators only. The reason to analyze the
group of precontemplators as a separate group is partly based on previous research, which found that
smokers who hold self-exempting beliefs are more likely to be in the precontemplation stage of change
(Oakes et al., 2004). Disengagement beliefs can be considered a fundamental process that may prevent
the smoker from seriously thinking about or considering the consequences of his or her behavior;
therefore, the group of precontemplators is particularly likely to engage in disengagement beliefs. The
distinction between precontemplators, contemplators, and preparers as one group and the precontem-
plators as a separate group, was also made when conducting the logistic regression analyses to assess
whether disengagement beliefs significantly predict actual quitting at T2.
For the examination of the relation between disengagement beliefs and the processes of change,
Pearson correlations were computed. To assess whether processes of change mediate the relationship
between disengagement beliefs and respectively forward stage transition and actual quitting, mediation
analyses were conducted according to the method described by Baron and Kenny (1986). First, forward
stage transition (dependent variable) was regressed on disengagement beliefs (independent variable).
Second, the mediator was regressed on disengagement beliefs (the mediator being one of the processes of
change). Finally, forward stage transition was regressed on both disengagement beliefs and the mediator
variables. Mediation was considered to exist if the conditions proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986) were
met. Disengagement beliefs should therefore be associated with both forward stage transition and the
mediator, the mediator should be associated with forward stage transition, and disengagement beliefs may
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mediation was indicated when the association between disengagement beliefs and forward stage transition
decreased, but had not fully disappeared after adding the mediator. To test whether the explained variance
significantly increased after adding the mediator, and to establish whether the decrease of the effect of
disengagement beliefs was large enough to indicate (partial) mediation, model chi-square values of the
model including disengagement beliefs were deducted from the model chi-square values of the model
including both disengagement beliefs and the mediator. If the remaining value was higher than 3.84
(p=0.05), the increase of explained variance was considered significant (Voeten & Van den Bercken,
2003). Mediation analyses were carried out for precontemplators, contemplators, and preparers at T1
taken together, and separately for the group of precontemplators at T1. The same procedure was employed
to assess mediation of the processes of change in the relationship between disengagement beliefs and
actual quitting. In the prospective analyses, gender, age, and education were entered as covariates. The
relation between the number of cigarettes per day and forward stage transition and actual quitting
respectively, appeared to be non-significant; therefore, the number of cigarettes smoked per day was not
entered as a covariate in the prospective analyses.3. Results
3.1. Stages of change and smoking-related cognitions and characteristics
Smokers in the three stages of behavioral change differ in the extent to which they adhere to
disengagement beliefs (see Table 3). Scheffe’s post-hoc analyses showed that precontemplators adhere
significantly stronger to disengagement beliefs than contemplators.Table 3
Stages of change and smoking-related cognitions and characteristics: cross-sectional analyses
Means in stages of change (S.D.)
Precontemplators Contemplators Preparers F
Disengagement beliefs 3.31a (0.77) 2.66b (0.78) 3.10 (0.72) 14.56***
Environmental evaluation 1.84a (0.86) 2.05 (0.92) 2.38b (0.86) 6.55*
Self-evaluation 1.17a (1.09) 2.54b (1.20) 2.56b (1.05) 47.49***
Consciousness raising 1.39a (0.95) 2.91b (0.86) 3.00b (0.89) 84.91***
Dramatic relief 1.11a (0.86) 1.45 (0.74) 1.90b (1.01) 13.13***
Reinforcement management 0.40a (0.46) 0.74b (0.73) 0.80b (0.86) 14.00***
Counterconditioning 0.72a (0.64) 0.96 (0.81) 1.13b (0.99) 6.38*
Stimulus control 0.25a (0.42) 0.55b (0.61) 0.75b (0.68) 22.08***
Helping relationship 0.40a (0.49) 1.05b (0.77) 0.78b (0.65) 30.94***
Cigarettes per day 19.66a (9.80) 18.23 (8.83) 15.48b (9.15) 2.94*
Years smoked 26.0 (12.8) 25.4 (12.1) 24.3 (14.5) 0.25
Quit attempts 2.06a (2.25) 4.05b (4.04) 4.00b (3.42) 16.32***
Longest quit attempt in days 241.6 (754.6) 304.5 (549.6) 561.7 (1253.05) 2.30
Means in the same row that do not share superscript differ at p b0.05 using Scheffe’s post-hoc tests.
* p b0.05.
*** p b0.001.
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the eight processes of change included in this study (Table 3). For self-evaluation, consciousness
raising, reinforcement management, stimulus control, and helping relationship, post-hoc tests showed
less engagement in precontemplators than in contemplators, and also less in precontemplators than in
preparers. For environmental evaluation, dramatic relief, and counterconditioning differences were
shown between precontemplators and preparers, i.e., precontemplators showed less engagement in the
processes than did preparers. Furthermore, the difference between the stages of change with regard to
the number of cigarettes smoked per day appeared to be significant; this indicates that
precontemplators smoked more cigarettes in one day than preparers. With respect to quit attempts,
precontemplators reported fewer attempts to quit than contemplators and preparers did. Smokers in the
three stages of behavioral change did not differ in the number of years smoked and duration of the
longest quit attempt.
3.2. Prediction of forward stage transition and actual quitting
For the total group of smokers, findings from a logistic regression analysis showed that smokers
who strongly adhered to disengagement beliefs at T1 showed significantly less forward stage
transition (see Table 5). Strong disengagement beliefs at T1 were also associated with a lower
probability of actual quitting at T2.
3.3. Correlations between disengagement beliefs and processes of change
In the total sample, disengagement beliefs were significantly correlated to six of the eight
processes of change. Only environmental evaluation and counterconditioning did not significantly
correlate with disengagement beliefs (see Table 4). The more smokers adhered to disengagement
beliefs, the less likely they were to engage in self-evaluation, consciousness raising, dramatic relief,
reinforcement management, and stimulus control, and the fewer helping relationships they perceived.Table 4
Intercorrelations between processes of change and disengagement beliefs at T1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Disengagement beliefs – 0.02 0.35*** 0.39*** 0.24*** 0.13* 0.08 0.13* 0.15**
2. Environmental evaluation 0.06 – 0.48*** 0.44*** 0.57*** 0.31*** 0.17** 0.19*** 0.24***
3. Self-evaluation 0.24*** 0.45*** – 0.83*** 0.63*** 0.39*** 0.25*** 0.36*** 0.38***
4. Consciousness raising 0.32*** 0.41*** 0.78*** – 0.64*** 0.44*** 0.28*** 0.38*** 0.43***
5. Dramatic relief 0.19** 0.52*** 0.65*** 0.65*** – 0.41*** 0.21*** 0.29*** 0.27***
6. Reinforcement management 0.12* 0.25*** 0.36*** 0.42*** 0.40*** – 0.54*** 50*** 0.59***
7. Counterconditioning 0.04 0.11 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.20*** 0.50*** – 0.60*** 0.32***
8. Stimulus control 0.10 0.10 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.29*** 0.45*** 0.54*** – 0.35***
9. Helping relationship 0.05 0.21*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.21*** 0.50*** 0.26*** 0.28*** –
Correlations above diagonal represent the total sample; correlations below diagonal represent the group of precontemplators
exclusively.
* p b0.05.
** p b0.01.
*** p b0.001.
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3.4.1. Forward stage transition
For the total sample of smokers at T1, disengagement beliefs were significantly associated with
forward stage transition (see Table 5; Nagelkerke R2=0.07). The conditions for complete mediation were
only met for consciousness raising (Table 5). Adding consciousness raising to the model significantly
increased the explained variance (Nagelkerke R2=0.13; v2(1, N=360)=11.98, pb0.01)1 and the relation
between disengagement beliefs and forward stage transition was no longer significant (p=0.08). Self-
evaluation, stimulus control, and helping relationship partially mediate the relation between
disengagement beliefs and forward stage transition. Adding self-evaluation to the model resulted in a
significant increase (Nagelkerke R2=0.08; v2(1, N=361)=5.28, pb0.05). Disengagement beliefs,
however, remained significantly associated with forward stage transition (Table 5). Similar results were
found for stimulus control and helping relationship, i.e., Nagelkerke R2=0.10 (v2(1, N=355)=5.93,
pb0.05) and Nagelkerke R2=0.12 (v2(1, N=356)=9.65, pb0.05), respectively. The processes of
dramatic relief and reinforcement management were not found to be mediating factors in the association
between disengagement beliefs and forward stage transition.
3.4.2. Quitting
The relation between disengagement beliefs and quitting was found to be significant (Table 5;
Nagelkerke R2=0.04). Mediation analyses showed three processes of change that completely
mediated the relation between disengagement beliefs and quitting (see Table 5). Adding
consciousness to the regression equation resulted in a non-significant association between
disengagement beliefs (p=0.36) and quitting, and a significant increase in the explained variance
to Nagelkerke R2=0.07 (v2(1, N=362)=5.95, pb0.05). Similar results were found for stimulus
control and helping relationship, i.e., Nagelkerke R2=0.07 (v2(1, N=357)=5.97, pb0.05) and
Nagelkerke R2=0.06 (v2(1, N =358)=4.82, p b0.05), respectively, and the association between
disengagement beliefs and quitting disappeared (p=0.11 and p=0.11). In the relation between
disengagement beliefs and quitting, no mediation effect was found for self-evaluation.
3.5. Precontemplators only
In precontemplators exclusively, adhering strongly to disengagement beliefs was related to less
consciousness raising, self-evaluation, dramatic relief, and reinforcement management (see Table 4).
Disengagement beliefs were also associated with forward stage transition (see Table 5; Nagelkerke
R2=0.11). Having stronger disengagement beliefs at T1 was related to a lower likelihood of forward
stage transition. In precontemplators, stronger disengagement beliefs were not significantly associated
with actual quitting (OR=0.65, CI=0.34–1.25, p=0.20).
In precontemplators, mediation analyses showed two processes of change that partially mediated the
relationship between disengagement beliefs and forward stage transition (see Table 5). Adding
consciousness raising and self-evaluation to the model resulted in a significant increase in the1
The v2-value represents the model chi-square values of the model including disengagement beliefs deducted from the model chi-square
values of the model including both disengagement beliefs and the mediator.
Table 5
Prediction of forward stage transition and quitting by disengagement beliefs and the processes of change
Forward stage transition Actual quitting
All stages Precontemplators All stages
Variable OR 95% CI OR 95% CI OR 95% CI
Step 1
Disengagement beliefs 0.53*** 0.36–0.76 0.47** 0.29–0.75 0.62* 0.40–0.98
Step 2
Disengagement beliefs 0.69 0.45–1.04 0.58* 0.35–0.95 0.79 0.47–1.31
Consciousness raising 1.61*** 1.23–2.12 1.72** 1.19–2.49 1.47* 1.04–2.07
Disengagement beliefs 0.63* 0.42–0.96 0.55* 0.33–0.90 0.74 0.45–1.23
Self-evaluation 1.34* 1.04–1.71 1.44* 1.06–1.97 1.29 0.94–1.76
Disengagement beliefs 0.53*** 0.36–0.78 0.50** 0.31–0.80
Dramatic relief 1.03 0.76–1.39 1.28 0.88–1.87
Disengagement beliefs 0.55** 0.38–0.81 0.50** 0.31–0.81
Reinforcement management 1.42 0.90–2.24 1.90 0.95–3.80
Disengagement beliefs 0.56** 0.38–0.82 0.68 0.42–1.09
Stimulus control 1.92** 1.18–3.15 2.02** 1.12–3.62
Disengagement beliefs 0.57** 0.39–0.84 0.68 0.43–1.09
Helping relationship 2.06*** 1.33–3.19 1.74* 1.02–2.99
OR=odds ratio; CI=confidence interval.
* p b0.05.
** p b0.01.
*** p b0.001.
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R2=0.14 (v2(1, N=284)=5.06, pb0.05), respectively. However, disengagement beliefs remained a
significant predictor of forward stage transition (see Table 5). In precontemplators, dramatic relief,
reinforcement management, stimulus control, and helping relationship did not have a mediating role in
the relation between disengagement beliefs and forward stage transition.4. Discussion
Our findings indicate that having stronger disengagement beliefs seems to be an inhibitor of the
motivation to quit smoking. We found that disengagement beliefs are associated with forward stage
transition and stronger disengagement beliefs are indicative of less actual quitting over the following
8 months. These results correspond with findings from previous studies showing negative relations
between both disengagement beliefs and intention to quit (Dijkstra, 2003; Dijkstra et al., 1999;
Dijkstra et al., 2003; Oakes et al., 2004; Olshavsky & Summers, 1974) and quit attempts (Dijkstra,
2003; Dijkstra et al., 1999; Dijkstra et al., 2003).
In addition, stronger disengagement beliefs in the total sample were associated with less
engagement in processes that facilitate quitting smoking, i.e., self-evaluation, consciousness raising,
dramatic relief, reinforcement management, stimulus control, and helping relationship. There was,
however, no significant association between disengagement beliefs and two processes, namely
environmental evaluation and counterconditioning. An explanation for the absence of an association
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mostly related to one’s own health (bit’s not all that badQ). It is therefore possible that disengagement
beliefs are not related to the evaluation of the effect of one’s smoking on the environment. In case of
counterconditioning, it was suggested earlier that increased use of counterconditioning is a direct
result of quitting, and that once a smoker quits, he or she is forced to replace smoking with
something else (Segan, Borland, & Greenwood, 2002). Because of the proposed direct relation
between counterconditioning and quitting, once a smoker makes use of counterconditioning, he or
she is probably already considerably determined to quit and therefore no longer susceptible to
disengagement beliefs.
Some evidence was found for a mediating role of the processes of change in the association of
disengagement beliefs with forward stage transition and actual quitting. This mediating role was,
however, not very substantial. After controlling for almost all processes of change, an assumed distal
construct like disengagement beliefs remains directly associated with forward stage transition.
Consciousness raising was the only process that fully mediated this relation. Additional analyses
suggested that all processes of change together explained about 16% of the variance in forward stage
transition (Nagelkerke R2), while disengagement beliefs alone account for 7% of the variance. Previous
research by Herzog, Abrams, Emmons, Linnan, and Shadel (1999) on the utility of the processes of
change in predicting movement through the stages of change reported that the processes of change
were not predictive of progressive movement through the stages of change. In our study, however, we
found that specific processes of change were related to forward stage transition. Furthermore, Segan et
al. (2002, 2004) found no relationship between use of the behavioral processes of change and making
and sustaining a quit attempt. In the present study, the relation between disengagement beliefs and
actual quitting was mediated by three processes of change. Having disengagement beliefs seems to
prevent consciousness raising, stimulus control, and helping relationship processes, and less
engagement in these processes in turn prevents actual quitting. It must be noted, however, that we
tested the predictive ability of the processes of change across the whole spectrum of the stages of
change, whereas the studies by Segan et al. involved only smokers in the preparation phase (Segan et
al., 2002), and smokers in the contemplation phase and preparation phase (Segan et al., 2004).
In our study, results for precontemplators only, showed some differences compared to the results for
the total sample consisting of precontemplators, contemplators, as well as preparers. First, there was no
significant relationship between adhering to disengagement beliefs and actual quitting, and, secondly,
consciousness raising was only a partial mediator and there was no partial mediation of stimulus control
and helping relationship. These differences might be explained by the lack of intention or motivation to
change that is characteristic for smokers in the precontemplation stage. It will be less likely that
precontemplators will quit 8 months later than smokers in the contemplation and preparation stage, who
have already started to consider behavioral change or have already taken steps in the direction of
quitting. The absence of stimulus control and helping relationship as partial mediators might be
explained by the more frequent usage of these behavioral processes in the later stages of change. It is less
likely that these processes play a role in the precontemplation stage or that they have a mediating
function in the relation between disengagement beliefs and forward stage transitions. In addition, our
data may have limited statistical power to detect a significant relation between disengagement beliefs
and actual quitting or a mediating role of the processes of change in precontemplators.
The findings of the present longitudinal study indicate that smokers tend to adhere to
disengagement beliefs, and that strong adherence to disengagement beliefs inhibits them from making
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important to challenge their disengagement beliefs. In the study by Oakes et al. (2004) on self-
exempting beliefs, it was reported that it is essential to make the relative risks of smoking more salient
to smokers; interventions should aim at improving knowledge by making the facts more credible, or
by using genuinely new facts in order to challenge the beliefs and change the balance of worth away
from smoking. Challenging the disengagement beliefs of smokers by increasing their awareness is,
however, a difficult task. In agreement with the cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), there is
a chance that the improved knowledge and introduction of new and/or more credible facts will give
rise to perceived threat and thereby to an even stronger adherence to disengagement beliefs. It is
therefore important to find a way of challenging disengagement beliefs without increasing the
perceived threat in such a way that it results in a higher need for disengagement beliefs. A way to
achieve this may be to use arguments that directly challenge disengagement beliefs and that
undermine them, i.e., debunk the myth. For instance, the argument of knowing smokers aged 80 years
that are in good health could be challenged by the counterargument that for every smoker aged 80
years, two aged 60 years have already died.
Taking the results of the present study into account, it seems worthwhile to combine the challenging
of disengagement beliefs with an attempt to increase engagement in those processes of change that have
shown to be of importance in the progression towards cessation and actual quitting. It has already been
suggested that an effective way to convince people to accept recommendations is to combine the offer of
threatening information with efficacy messages which offer responses that appear easy to accomplish
(Witte & Allen, 2000). Defensive reactions to threatening information or fear appeals can be prevented
by offering behavior recommendations and alternatives (Das, De Wit, & Stroebe, 2003). Encouraging
smokers to engage in consciousness raising, stimulus control, and helping relationship after challenging
their disengagement beliefs by providing debiasing information may therefore be an effective method to
encourage smoking cessation. Future research addressing this research topic is, however, still needed.
The present study had some limitations. First, the method of recruitment may have led to a selective
sample of smokers, related to the motivation to participate. In the recruitment procedure, however, care
was taken to minimize a selection bias by mentioning explicitly that participants did not have to quit
smoking or remain quitted to join the study. Furthermore, it was stated that their answers were not related
to their chances of winning one of the prizes, that all data would be confidential and that respondents had
the opportunity to withdraw from the study whenever they wanted to, without any further obligations. A
second limitation is that the group of precontemplators was relatively large compared to the group of
contemplators and preparers. This could be at the cost of the generalizability of the results to the
smoking population at large. However, results from another Dutch study (Stivoro-rookvrij, 2005)
showed that among Dutch smokers 70% was in the precontemplation stage, 18% in the contemplation
stage, and 12% in the preparation stage; this representative Dutch sample shows a similar distribution to
the sample used in the present study, and indicates that in, The Netherlands, the group of
precontemplators is relatively large compared to the group of contemplators and preparers.
In conclusion, the present longitudinal study showed a clear relationship between disengagement
beliefs and future plans to quit smoking, as well as actual cessation. We explored these relations further
by taking into account possible mediators of these relationships, i.e., the processes of change. This study
aimed to enhance the understanding of having disengagement beliefs in relation to smoking cessation,
and its findings may be useful for the development of interventions to challenge the beliefs that are held
by many smokers.
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